Government Control of Privatized Firms

被引:164
作者
Bortolotti, Bernardo [1 ,2 ]
Faccio, Mara [3 ]
机构
[1] FEEM, I-20123 Milan, Italy
[2] Univ Turin, Dept Econ & Finance, I-10124 Turin, Italy
[3] Purdue Univ, Krannert Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA
关键词
D72; G15; H6; K22; L33; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; OWNERSHIP; LAW;
D O I
10.1093/rfs/hhn077
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We study the change in government control of privatized firms in OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. At the end of 2000, after the largest privatization wave in history, governments retained control of 62.4% of privatized firms. In civil law countries, governments tend to retain large ownership positions, whereas in common law countries they typically use golden shares. When we combine these two mechanisms, we find no association between a country's legal tradition and the extent of government control. Rather, we document more prevalent government influence over privatized firms in countries with proportional electoral rules and with a centralized system of political authority.
引用
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页码:2907 / 2939
页数:33
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