Luck, effort, and reward in an organizational hierarchy

被引:44
作者
Audas, R
Barmby, T [1 ]
Treble, J
机构
[1] Univ Aberdeen, Aberdeen AB9 1FX, Scotland
[2] Mem Univ Newfoundland, St Johns, NF A1C 5S7, Canada
[3] Univ Wales Swansea, Swansea, W Glam, Wales
关键词
D O I
10.1086/381254
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Using the personnel records of a large British financial sector employer we investigate how workers respond to remuneration differences and "luck" in the promotion system. The results confirm that workers respond to larger remuneration spreads by working harder. Increased certainty in the promotion process also has this effect. There appears to be no difference between men's and women's reactions to promotion incentives. Gender differences in the raw data therefore appear not due to incentives. We need to look elsewhere for an explanation.
引用
收藏
页码:379 / 395
页数:17
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