The sale of ideas: Strategic disclosure, property rights, and contracting

被引:146
作者
Anton, JJ [1 ]
Yao, DA
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Durham, NC 27706 USA
[2] Univ Penn, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1111/1467-937X.t01-1-00020
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea's value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea. These problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions and reflect the nonverifiability of key elements of an intellectual property sale. An expropriable partial disclosure can be used as a signal, allowing the seller to obtain payment based on the value of the remaining (undisclosed) know-how. We examine contracting after the disclosure and find that seller wealth is pivotal in supporting a partial disclosure equilibrium and in determining the payoff size.
引用
收藏
页码:513 / 531
页数:19
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