Audience effects on moralistic punishment

被引:230
作者
Kurzban, Robert [1 ]
DeScioli, Peter [1 ]
O'Brien, Erin [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Dept Psychol, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
关键词
punishment; altruism; reciprocity; cooperation; reputation;
D O I
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.06.001
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
Punishment has been proposed as being central to two distinctively human phenomena: cooperation in groups and morality. Here we investigate moralistic punishment, a behavior designed to inflict costs on another individual in response to a perceived moral violation. There is currently no consensus on which evolutionary model best accounts for this phenomenon in humans. Models that turn on individuals' cultivating reputations as moralistic punishers clearly predict that psychological systems should be designed to increase punishment in response to information that one's decisions to punish will be known by others. We report two experiments in which we induce participants to commit moral violations and then present third parties with the opportunity to pay to punish wrongdoers. Varying conditions of anonymity, we find that the presence of an audience-even if only the experimenter-causes an increase in moralistic punishment. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:75 / 84
页数:10
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