The logic of thought experiments

被引:17
作者
Bunzl, M
机构
[1] Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Brunswick
关键词
D O I
10.1007/BF00413701
中图分类号
N09 [自然科学史]; B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ; 010108 ; 060207 ; 060305 ; 0712 ;
摘要
In this paper I argue that (at least many) philosophical thought experiments are unreliable. But I argue that this notion of unreliability has to be understood relative to the goal of thought experiments as knowledge producing. And relative to that goal many thought experiments in science are just as unreliable. But in fact thought experiments in science play a varied role and I will suggest that knowledge production is a goal only under quite limited circumstances. I defend the view that these circumstances can (sometimes) arise in philosophy as well.
引用
收藏
页码:227 / 240
页数:14
相关论文
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