How conceptual problems migrate: Rational choice, interpretation, and the hazards of pluralism

When they assess competing theories, political scientists typically rely almost exclusively and rather naively on criteria of empirical performance. They have correspondingly little to say about conceptual problems and seem generally unaware of the extent to which their assessments of empirical performance are parasitic on conceptual commitments. This blind spot, in turn, hinders their ability both to persuasively conduct and critically assess substantive research. I call attention to the importance and complexity of conceptual problems for ongoing social and political research. As a vehicle for this argument, I examine and criticize recent attempts to integrate interpretive and rational choice theories in hopes of improving our understanding of how culture and politics intersect. I argue that these efforts are plagued by important, mostly unrecognized conceptual problems that, in turn, subvert their explicitly stated explanatory objectives. I also show, in light of this same example, how conceptual problems unintentionally can frustrate laudable pluralist aspirations. This essay illustrates why, if we take conceptual problems seriously, calls for methodological and theoretical pluralism are significantly more demanding than they often appear.