CREDIT RATING AND DEBT CRISES

被引：7

作者：

Holden, Steinar ^{[1
]}

Natvik, Gisle James

Vigier, Adrien

机构：

[1] Univ Oslo, N-0442 Oslo, Norway

来源：

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2018年 / 59卷 / 02期

关键词：

CATALYTIC FINANCE; COORDINATION; MULTIPLICITY; INFORMATION; PRICES; MODEL; GAME;

D O I：

10.1111/iere.12293

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We develop an equilibrium theory of credit rating in the presence of rollover risk. By influencing rational creditors, ratings affect sovereigns' probability of default, which in turn affects ratings. Our analysis reveals a pro-cyclical impact of credit rating: In equilibrium the presence of a rating agency increases default risk when it is high and decreases default risk when it is low.

引用

收藏

页码：973 / 987

页数：15

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