Disclosure processing costs, investors' information choice, and equity market outcomes: A review

被引:455
作者
Blankespoor, Elizabeth [1 ]
deHaan, Ed [1 ]
Marinovic, Ivan [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
[2] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
Disclosure processing costs; Limited attention; Disclosure pricing; Information awareness; Information acquisition; Information integration; EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT PROMOTIONS; FINANCIAL-STATEMENT PRESENTATION; ANNUAL-REPORT READABILITY; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; CAPITAL-MARKETS; STOCK RETURNS; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; LIMITED ATTENTION; TEXTUAL ANALYSIS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101344
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
020219 [财政学(含:税收学)];
摘要
This paper reviews the literature examining how costs of monitoring for, acquiring, and analyzing firm disclosures - collectively, "disclosure processing costs" - affect investor information choices, trades, and market outcomes. The existence of disclosure processing costs means that disclosures are not "public" information as traditionally defined, but instead can be a form of costly private information. Conceptualizing disclosures as private information makes it clear that learning from disclosures is an active economic choice and that disclosure pricing cannot be perfectly efficient. We review the analytical and empirical literature on sources of processing costs and how these costs affect equity market outcomes, primarily within rational equilibria. We also discuss studies of the feedback effects of investors' processing costs on managers' choices about disclosure and corporate actions. We conclude that disclosure processing costs have implications for a wide array of accounting research and phenomena, but we are only just beginning to understand their effects. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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收藏
页数:46
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