Privatization in emerging economies: An agency theory perspective

被引:423
作者
Dharwadkar, R [1 ]
George, G [1 ]
Brandes, P [1 ]
机构
[1] Syracuse Univ, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/259316
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The ineffectiveness of several privatized firms within emerging economies underscores the importance of agency theory issues and their impact on the privatization performance relationship. We argue that weak governance and limited protection of minority shareholders intensify traditional principal-agent problems (perquisite consumption and entrenchment) and create unique agency problems (expropriation). We suggest that postprivatization performance earn be enhanced by using appropriate ownership, management, and corporate structures that mitigate agency problems in the context of weak governance, and we highlight avenues for research.
引用
收藏
页码:650 / 669
页数:20
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