How to set minimum acceptable bids, with an application to real estate auctions

被引：19

作者：

McAfee, RP ^{[1
]}

Quan, DC

Vincent, DR

机构：

[1] Univ Texas, Dept Econ, Austin, TX 78712 USA

[2] Cornell Univ, Financial Managment Dept, Ithaca, NY 14853 USA

[3] Univ Maryland, Dept Econ, College Pk, MD 20742 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS | 2002年 / 50卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/1467-6451.00183

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

In a general auction model with affiliated signals, common components to valuations and endogenous entry, we compute the equilibrium bidding strategies and outcomes, and derive a lower bound on the optimal reserve price. This lower bound can be computed using data on past auctions combined with information about the subsequent sales prices of unsold goods. We illustrate how to compute the lower bound using data from real estate auctions.

引用

页码：391 / 416

页数：26

共 21 条

[1] HOW AUCTIONS WORK FOR WINE AND ART [J].