Land rights;
Contract duration;
Investment;
Soil capital;
Hold-up problem;
LAND TENANCY;
DURATION;
INCENTIVES;
RIGHTS;
D O I:
10.1007/s10640-013-9719-y
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
020101 [政治经济学];
摘要:
We present a dynamic model that shows how different types of land tenancy contracts and their time-related characteristics influence farmers' decisions to invest in soil improvement and productive inputs. Using recent household and plot-level data from the Brong-Ahafo Region in Ghana, we analyze the impact of land tenancy arrangements, contract duration, as well as the number of times the contract has been renewed in the past on the intensity of investment in soil conservation measures such as ditches and farmyard manure and productive inputs like chemical fertilizer. The empirical findings generally confirm the predictions of the theoretical model and reveal that the intensity of investments on different plots cultivated by a given farmer varies significantly with the type of tenancy arrangement on the plot as well as the time-related characteristics of the contract.