Tax Aggressiveness and Accounting Fraud

被引:155
作者
Lennox, Clive [1 ]
Lisowsky, Petro [2 ]
Pittman, Jeffrey [3 ]
机构
[1] Nanyang Technol Univ, Singapore, Singapore
[2] Univ Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801 USA
[3] Mem Univ Newfoundland, St John, NF A1C 5S7, Canada
关键词
AUDITOR LITIGATION; EARNINGS QUALITY; CORPORATE; INCENTIVES; BOOK; MARKET; AVOIDANCE; FIRMS; COMPENSATION; RESTATEMENTS;
D O I
10.1111/joar.12002
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
There are competing arguments and mixed prior evidence on whether firms that are aggressive in their financial reporting exhibit more or less tax aggressiveness. Our research contributes to resolving this issue by examining the association between aggressive tax reporting and the incidence of alleged accounting fraud. Relying on several proxies for tax aggressiveness to triangulate our evidence, we generally find that tax aggressive U.S. public firms are less likely to commit accounting fraud. However, we caution that our results are sensitive to how tax aggressiveness is measured. More specifically, four (two) of the five (three) proxies for firms' effective tax rates (book-tax differences) load positively (negatively) during the 1981-2001 period, implying that fraud firms are less tax aggressiveness. Our inferences persist when we isolate the 1995-2001 period in which accounting impropriety steeply rose and corporate tax compliance steeply fell. Moreover, we continue to find that tax aggressive firms are less apt to fraudulently manipulate their financial statements when we apply factor analysis to identify tax avoidance with a common factor extracted from the underlying proxies and match on propensity scores to ensure that the fraud and nonfraud samples have very similar non-tax characteristics.
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页码:739 / 778
页数:40
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