Founding family controlled firms: Performance, risk, and value

被引：264

作者：

McConaughy, DL ^{[1
]}

Matthews, CH

Fialko, AS

机构：

[1] Calif State Univ Northridge, Family Business Ctr, Northridge, CA 91330 USA

[2] Univ Cincinnati, Ctr Entrepreneurhip Educ & Res & Small Business I, Cincinnati, OH 45221 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT | 2001年 / 39卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/0447-2778.00004

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

An agency theory framework is used to test the effects of founding family control on firm performance, capital structure, and value. Both the finance and Management literatures regarding the relationship between firm control and firm value are explored. Controlling for size, industry, and managerial ownership, the results suggest that firms controlled by the founding family have greater value, are operated more efficiently, and carry less debt than other firms.

引用

页码：31 / 49

页数：19

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