$1,000 cash back: The pass-through of auto manufacturer promotions

被引:121
作者
Busse, Meghan [1 ]
Silva-Risso, Jorge
Zettelmeyer, Florian
机构
[1] Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[2] Univ Calif Riverside, AG Anderson Grad Sch Management, Riverside, CA 92521 USA
[3] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/aer.96.4.1253
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Automobile manufacturers frequently use promotions involving cash incentives. While payments are nominally directed to either customers or dealers, the ultimate beneficiary of the promotion depends on the outcome of price negotiation. We use program evaluation methods to compare the incidence of these two types or promotions. Customers obtain 70 to 90 percent of a customer rebate, but only 30 to 40 percent of a dealer discount promotion, a $500 difference for a typical promotion. Our leading hypothesis is that pass-through rates differ because of information asymmetries: customer rebates are well-publicized to customers, while dealer discount promotions are not.
引用
收藏
页码:1253 / 1270
页数:18
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