Monopoly pricing when customers queue

被引:103
作者
Chen, H
Frank, M
机构
[1] Cheung Kong Grad Sch Business, Beijing 100738, Peoples R China
[2] Univ British Columbia, Sauder Sch Business, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2, Canada
基金
中国国家自然科学基金; 加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词
D O I
10.1080/07408170490438690
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
It takes time to process purchases and as a result a queue of customers may form. The pricing and capacity (service rate) decision of a monopolist who must take this into account are characterized. We find that an increase in the average number of customers arriving in the market either has no effect on the price, or else causes the firm to reduce the price in the short run. In the long run the firm will increase capacity and raise the price. When customer preferences are linear, the equilibrium is socially efficient. When preferences are not linear, the equilibrium will not normally be socially efficient.
引用
收藏
页码:569 / 581
页数:13
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