Controlling pollution with relaxed regulations

被引:14
作者
Arguedas, C [1 ]
Hamoudi, H [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Europea Madrid, Dept Econ, Madrid 28670, Spain
关键词
environmental standard-setting; costly inspections; reduced fines; clean technologies;
D O I
10.1023/B:REGE.0000028015.46270.b5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate the features of optimal environmental policies composed of pollution standards and costly inspection processes, where fines for exceeding the standards depend both on the degree of transgression and the environmental technology that the firm uses to reduce the social impact of its polluting activity We show that the main characteristics of these policies depend crucially on when the firm selects that technology with respect to the timing of the policy announcement. In fact, the firm has incentives to over-invest in green technologies when the policy is announced afterwards; and to under-invest in them if the environmental authority plays first. Surprisingly, we find that both the firm and the regulator prefer that the firm invests in technology before the policy is announced, even when this implies that expected penalties for noncompliance might be zero.
引用
收藏
页码:85 / 104
页数:20
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