The Lander are the building blocks of the German capital market

被引:21
作者
Wójcik, D [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Oxford, Sch Geog & Environm, Oxford OX1 3TB, England
关键词
capital market integration; corporate control; German Lander;
D O I
10.1080/0034340022000012315
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Data on major voting blocks in the German officially listed companies for the end of 1997 and May 2001 are used in order to explore the spatial dimensions of the system of corporate control. Listed companies are very unevenly distributed, and their institutional and geographical concentration has not decreased. Holdings of voting blocks in companies are, in turn, getting more and more dispersed, but the majority of corporate control is still intraregional, with the holders of voting rights coming from the same Lander as the controlled corporations. Gravity equations show that distance is a very strong determinant of corporate control links, and its role applies to all types of companies and holders, though to a varying degree. From the perspective of corporate control, the German capital market is very regionalized. Considering that the study spans a short period of time, however, the pace of integration is pronounced.
引用
收藏
页码:877 / 895
页数:19
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