Tiebout? Or not tiebout? The Market metaphor and America's devolution debate

被引:50
作者
Donahue, JD
机构
[1] Department of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA
关键词
D O I
10.1257/jep.11.4.73
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The market metaphor of intergovernmental choice as a spur to efficiency (formalized by Charles M. Tiebout) is often invoked to support the shift away from Washington and toward the states. But the model translates badly to governments; governmental entry and exit is costly. Public-sector co11usion often serves citizens' interests. Heterogeneous mobility distorts the signals sent by interstate migration. And while Tiebout (and followers) condition efficiency predictions on optimal distribution, the U.S. devolution movement coincides with rising inequality and has gone furthest where distribution matters most. The metaphor is misapplied. Devolution will likely do more to enfeeble government than to improve it.
引用
收藏
页码:73 / 81
页数:9
相关论文
共 31 条
[1]  
*ADV COMM INT REL, 1991, INT TAX POL COMP GOO
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1989, FOREIGN DIRECT INVES
[3]  
Breton Albert, 1978, EC CONSTITUTION FEDE
[4]   ASSISTANCE TO THE POOR IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM [J].
BROWN, CC ;
OATES, WE .
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 1987, 32 (03) :307-330
[5]  
BROWNING EK, 1983, PUBLIC FINANCE PRICE
[6]   THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL COMPETITION ON THE DECISION TO ADOPT GAAP [J].
CARPENTER, VL .
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1991, 10 (02) :105-134
[7]   A BRIEF EMPIRICAL NOTE ON THE TIEBOUT HYPOTHESIS AND STATE INCOME-TAX POLICIES [J].
CEBULA, RJ .
PUBLIC CHOICE, 1990, 67 (01) :87-89
[8]  
CHI K, 1997, STATE BUSINESS INCEN
[9]  
Donahue J. D., 1997, Disunited states
[10]  
Goodman Robert., 1995, LUCK BUSINESS