Trade and foreign direct investment in China: a political economy approach

被引:77
作者
Branstetter, LG
Feenstra, RC [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif Davis, Dept Econ, Davis, CA 95616 USA
[2] Columbia Univ, Sch Business, New York, NY 10027 USA
[3] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
China; WTO; foreign direct investment; political economy;
D O I
10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00172-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We view the political process in China as trading off the social benefits of increased trade and foreign direct investment against the losses incurred by state-owned enterprises due to such liberalization. A model drawing on Grossman and Helpman [Am. Econ. Rev. 84 (1994) 833; The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati, MIT Press, Cambridge (1996) 199] is used to derive an empirically estimable government objective function. The key structural parameters - of this model are estimated using province-level data on foreign direct investment and trade flows in China, over the years 1984-1995. We find that the weight applied to consumer welfare is between one-seventh and one-quarter of the weight applied to the output of state-owned enterprises. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:335 / 358
页数:24
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