Adversarial legalism and transaction costs: The industrial-flight hypothesis revisited

被引:20
作者
Anderson, CL
Kagan, RA
机构
[1] Carleton Univ, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada
[2] Univ Washington, Daniel J Evans Sch Publ Affairs, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
[3] Univ Calif Berkeley, Ctr Study Law & Soc, Sch Law, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
关键词
international; law and economics;
D O I
10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00018-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 19
页数:19
相关论文
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