Sorting with motivated agents: Implications for school competition and teacher incentives

被引：17

作者：

Besley, Timothy ^{[1
]}

Ghatak, Maitreesh ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] London Sch Econ, London, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION | 2006年 / 4卷 / 2-3期

基金：

英国经济与社会研究理事会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1162/jeea.2006.4.2-3.404

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper proposes a simple framework to study incentives and matching in the market for teachers. The framework is used to investigate the consequences of introducing incentive pay for teachers when contracts have both a matching and an incentive effect. Our analysis suggests that school competition and teacher incentives cannot be studied in isolation from one another.

引用

页码：404 / 414

页数：11