Politics and length of time to bank failure: 1986-1990

被引：6

作者：

Bennett, RW ^{[1
]}

Loucks, C ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] BOISE STATE UNIV,DEPT ECON,BOISE,ID 83725

来源：

CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY | 1996年 / 14卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1465-7287.1996.tb00631.x

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper extends research on the savings and loan (S&L) industry to the banking industry in order to determine whether political influence affects the length 4 time from initial undercapitalization until ultimate bank failure. Results suggest that undercapitalized banks with representation on the House banking committee were allowed to remain open longer than were other undercapitalized banks. These results provide evidence that membership on relevant House committees matters.

引用

页码：29 / 41

页数：13

共 51 条

[1]

ANDERSON GM, 1988, PUBLIC CHOICE, P3

[2]

BARTH J, 1991, GREAT SAVINGS LOAN D

[3]

Barth J. R., 1992, REFORM FEDERAL DEPOS

[4]

Barth J.R., 1985, P C BANK STRUCTURE C, P184

[5] THRIFT DEREGULATION AND FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE [J].

BARTH, JR ;

BRADLEY, MG .

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL SERVICES RESEARCH, 1989, 2 (03) :231-259

[6]

BARTH JR, 1991, CONT POLICY ISSU JAN, P24

[7]

BARTH JR, 1989, 161 OFF POL EC RES

[8]

BARTH JR, 1994, GLOB COMP AN FIN I R

[9]

BARTH JR, 1992, REFORM FEDERAL DEPOS, P36

[10]

BARTH JR, 1985, CONT POLICY ISSU FAL, P1

← 1 2 3 4 5 6 →