Value destruction and financial reporting decisions

被引:78
作者
Graham, John R. [1 ]
Harvey, Campbell R.
Rajgopal, Shiva
机构
[1] Duke Univ, Fuqua Sch Business, Durham, NC 27706 USA
[2] Univ Washington, Seattle, WA 98195 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2469/faj.v62.n6.4351
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The comprehensive survey reported here allowed analysis of how senior U.S. financial executives make decisions related to performance measurement: and voluntary disclosure. Chief financial Officers were asked what earnings benchmarks they cared about and which factors motivated executives to exercise discretion-even sacrifice economic value-to deliver earnings. These issues are crucially linked to stock market performance. The results show that the destruction of shareholder value through legal means is pervasive, perhaps even a routine way of doing business. Indeed, the amount of value destroyed by companies striving to hit earnings targets exceeds the value lost in recent high-profile fraud cases.
引用
收藏
页码:27 / 39
页数:17
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