Markov perfect equilibrium advertising strategies of Lanchester duopoly model:: A technical note

被引:25
作者
Jarrar, R
Martín-Herrán, G
Zaccour, G
机构
[1] Gerad, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada
[2] HEC Montreal, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada
[3] Univ Valladolid, E-47011 Valladolid, Spain
关键词
Lanchester model; advertising strategies; Markov perfect Nash equilibrium;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1040.0249
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We propose a numerical approach to compute stationary Markov perfect Nash equilibrium advertising strategies of the Lanchester model. The algorithm can be implemented using a standard mathematical package, and, importantly, it does not require that the players discount their future earnings at a zero rate, an assumption that has been made in the literature.
引用
收藏
页码:995 / 1000
页数:6
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