Greenhouse gas abatement: How much? and Who pays?

被引：13

作者：

Chao, HP

Peck, S

机构：

[1] Stanford Univ, Environm Div, EES&OR, Palo Alto, CA 94304 USA

[2] Elect Power Res Inst, Palo Alto, CA 94303 USA

来源：

RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS | 2000年 / 22卷 / 01期

关键词：

greenhouse gas; global climate change; emission trading; environmental externality; Pareto optimum; bargaining set;

D O I：

10.1016/S0928-7655(99)00016-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Two basic questions that arise in international policy debates over greenhouse gas emission reduction are: (1) How much to control? and (2) Who pays? In this paper, we investigate the interdependence between these two issues. We characterize general conditions under which the Pareto-optimal environmental control will depend on the distribution of the cost burden among nations and provide a sufficient condition under which a Pareto optimum can be implemented by a market mechanism with tradable emission permits. However, numerical results suggest that the interdependence may be weak in a hypothetical negotiation between the OECD and the ROW (the rest of the world). The approach can be applied to more realistic cases with multiple regions. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1 / 20

页数：20

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