Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment

被引:395
作者
Greene, Joshua D. [3 ]
Cushman, Fiery A. [3 ]
Stewart, Lisa E. [3 ]
Lowenberg, Kelly [4 ]
Nystrom, Leigh E. [1 ,2 ]
Cohen, Jonathan D. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Psychol, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[2] Princeton Univ, Princeton Neurosci Inst, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[3] Harvard Univ, Dept Psychol, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[4] Stanford Law Sch, Stanford, CA 94305 USA
关键词
Moral psychology; Moral cognition; Moral judgment; Trolley problem; Personal force; Intention; PREFRONTAL CORTEX; INTUITIONS; COGNITION; DAMAGE;
D O I
10.1016/j.cognition.2009.02.001
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person's life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent's intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively "direct" or "personal". Here we integrate these two classes of findings. Two experiments examine a novel personalness/directness factor that we call personal force, present when the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent's muscles (e.g., in pushing). Experiments to and b demonstrate the influence of personal force on moral judgment, distinguishing it from physical contact and spatial proximity. Experiments 2a and b demonstrate an interaction between personal force and intention, whereby the effect of personal force depends entirely on intention. These studies also introduce a method for controlling for people's real-world expectations in decisions involving potentially unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:364 / 371
页数:8
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