Tax incidence with bargaining

被引：4

作者：

Chae, S ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Rice Univ, Dept Econ, Houston, TX 77005 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2002年 / 77卷 / 02期

关键词：

tax incidence; bargaining; nash bargaining solution; bargaining power;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00138-6

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The paper investigates tax incidence in a two-person bargaining model where one party is taxed. The condition under which the non-taxed party shares the burden of taxes (or benefit of subsidies) is characterized. Sufficient conditions for the tax burden to fall entirely on the taxed party are given. Also, a sufficient condition for the non-taxed party actually to benefit from taxation is given. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：199 / 204

页数：6

共 7 条

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