The Interaction between Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy

被引:195
作者
Angelini, Paolo [1 ]
Neri, Stefano [2 ]
Panetta, Fabio [3 ]
机构
[1] Banca Italia, Directorate Gen Financial Supervis & Regulat, Rome, Italy
[2] Banca Italia, Econ Outlook & Monetary Policy Directorate, Rome, Italy
[3] Banca Italia, I-00184 Rome, Italy
关键词
countercyclical capital requirements; monetary policy; credit supply; DSGE models; FINANCIAL CRISIS; AGENCY COSTS; DSGE MODEL; NET WORTH; CREDIT; LIQUIDITY; STABILITY; CYCLES; OUTPUT;
D O I
10.1111/jmcb.12134
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The interaction between capital requirements and monetary policy is assessed by means of simple rules in a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a banking sector. In "normal" times, when economic dynamics are driven by supply shocks, an active use of capital requirements generates modest benefits in terms of volatility of the target variables compared to the case in which only the central bank carries out stabilization policies. The lack of cooperation between the two policymakers may result in excessive volatility of the monetary policy rate and capital requirements. The benefits of introducing capital requirements become sizeable when financial shocks, which affect the supply of loans, are important drivers of economic dynamics; the availability of capital requirements as a policy tool yields a significant gain in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, regardless of the type of interaction between monetary and capital requirements policies.
引用
收藏
页码:1073 / 1112
页数:40
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