Shareholder value and corporate governance: some tricky questions

被引:102
作者
Aglietta, M [1 ]
机构
[1] CEPII, F-75015 Paris, France
关键词
shareholder value; corporate governance; growth regime; leverage; wealth accumulation;
D O I
10.1080/030851400360596
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Shareholder value is not a new idea. But it entails a shift in control over businesses with far-reaching macroeconomic consequences. They are mostly apparent in the USA. The required financial return spurs a momentous equity price appreciation which discourages private saving. Meanwhile, the achievement of a financial profitability consistently above the economic rate of return on real capital induces a rising leverage cum share buybacks. The financial dynamic is highly procyclical and generates a financial fragility which questions the hypothetical advantage of private pension funds over pay-as-you-go retirement systems.
引用
收藏
页码:146 / 159
页数:14
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