Voting power in the European Union enlargement

被引：45

作者：

Bilbao, JM ^{[1
]}

Fernández, JR ^{[1
]}

Jiménez, N ^{[1
]}

López, JJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Escuela Super Ingenieros, Seville 41092, Spain

来源：

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH | 2002年 / 143卷 / 01期

关键词：

power indices; generating function; computational complexity;

D O I：

10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00334-4

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学];

学科分类号：

12 [管理学]; 1201 [管理科学与工程]; 1202 [工商管理学]; 120202 [企业管理];

摘要：

The Shapley-Shubik power index in a voting situation depends on the number of orderings in which each player is pivotal. The Banzhaf power index depends on the number of ways in which each voter can effect a swing. If there are n players in a voting situation, then the function which measures the worst case running time for computing these indices is in O(n2(n)). We present a combinatorial method based in generating functions to compute these power indices efficiently in weighted double or triple majority games and we study the time complexity of the algorithms. Moreover, we calculate these power indices for the countries in the Council of Ministers of the European Union under the new decision rules prescribed by the Treaty of Nice. (C) 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.

引用

页码：181 / 196

页数：16

共 8 条

[1]

Banzhaf JF, 1965, Rutgers Law Review, V19, P317

[2]

Bilbao J. M., 2001, NICE RULES VOTING PO

[3]

Brams S.J., 1983, POLITICAL RELATED MO, P183

[4]

POWER AND SIZE - NEW PARADOX [J].