Network Externalities and the Deployment of Security Features and Protocols in the Internet

被引:40
作者
Lelarge, Marc [1 ]
Bolot, Jean [2 ]
机构
[1] INRIA ENS, 45 Rue Ulm, Paris, France
[2] SPRINT, W Covina, CA 91790 USA
来源
SIGMETRICS'08: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MEASUREMENT & MODELING OF COMPUTER SYSTEMS | 2008年 / 36卷 / 01期
关键词
Security; Game Theory; Epidemics; Economics; Price of Anarchy; Cascading;
D O I
10.1145/1384529.1375463
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
Getting new security features and protocols to be widely adopted and deployed in the Internet has been a continuing challenge. There are several reasons for this, in particular economic reasons arising from the presence of network externalities. Indeed, like the Internet itself, the technologies to secure it exhibit, network effects: their value to individual users changes is other users decide to adopt them or not. In particular, the benefits felt by early adopters of security solutions might fall significantly below the cost of adoption, making it difficult for those solutions to gain attraction and get deployed at a large scale. Our goal in this paper is to model and quantify the impact of such externalities on the adoptability and deployment of security features and protocols in the Internet. We Study a network of interconnected agents, which are subject to epidemic risks such is those caused by propagating viruses and worms, and which can decide whether or not to invest some amount to deploy security solutions. Agents experience negative externalities from other agents. as the risks faced by an agent depend not, only on the choices of that agent (whether or not to invest in self-protection), but also on those of the other agents. Expectations about choices made by other agents then influence investments in self-protection, resulting in a possibly suboptimal outcome overall. We present. and solve an analytical model where the agents are connected according to a variety of network topologies. Borrowing ideas and techniques used in statistical physics, we derive analytic solutions for sparse random graphs, for which we obtain asymptotic results. We show that we can explicitly identify the impact of network externalities on the adoptability and deployment of security features. In other words, we identify both the economic and network properties that determine the adoption of security technologies. Therefore, we expect our results to provide useful guidance for the design of new economic mechanisms and for the development of network protocols likely to be deployed at a large scale.
引用
收藏
页码:37 / +
页数:3
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