Traders, cops and robbers

被引：17

作者：

Anderson, James E.

Bandiera, Oriana

机构：

[1] Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England

[2] Boston Coll, Dept Econ, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA

[3] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[4] CEPR, London, England

来源：

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 70卷 / 01期

关键词：

predation; enforcement; mafias; trade costs; illegal trade;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.07.009

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We propose a simple model of trade outside the law preyed on by robbers and possibly protected by private cops. We establish the conditions for trade collapse, secure trade and insecure trade. Endogenous predation and enforcement can explain both puzzling failures of commonly observed state policies against illegal trade and puzzlingly large trade responses to liberalization in licit goods. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：197 / 215

页数：19

共 16 条

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