Paying for performance and motivation crowding out

被引:32
作者
Siciliani, Luigi [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ York, Dept Econ & Related Studies, York YO10 5DD, N Yorkshire, England
[2] CEPR, London EC1V 7DB, England
关键词
Altruism; Performance; Motivation; INCENTIVES; SERVICES; BEHAVIOR;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2009.01.022
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We investigate how prices affect output when publicly-funded providers differ in altruism, and enjoy being perceived as good and not as greedy. A higher price increases output for low and high-altruism providers. Intermediate-altruism providers do not respond or reduce output. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:68 / 71
页数:4
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