Threatening inefficient performance of injunctions and contracts

被引:31
作者
Ayres, I [1 ]
Madison, K [1 ]
机构
[1] Yale Univ, Sch Law, New Haven, CT 06520 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3312859
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码:45 / 108
页数:64
相关论文
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