What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?

被引:51
作者
Heron, Randall A. [1 ]
Lie, Erik [2 ]
机构
[1] Indiana Univ, Kelley Sch Business, Indianapolis, IN 46202 USA
[2] Univ Iowa, Tippie Coll Business, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
关键词
executive compensation; stock option grants; backdating; AWARDS; DETERMINANTS; GOVERNANCE; EQUITY;
D O I
10.1287/mnsc.1080.0958
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We estimate that 13.6% of all option grants to top executives during the period 1996-2005 were backdated or otherwise manipulated. Our study primarily focuses on grants that were unscheduled and at-the-money, of which we estimate that 18.9% were manipulated. The fraction is 23.0% before the new two-day. ling requirement took effect on August 29, 2002, and 10.0% afterward. For the minority of grants that are not filed within the required two-day window, the fraction of manipulated grants remains as high as 19.9%. We further find a higher frequency of manipulation among tech firms, small firms, and firms with high stock price volatility. In addition, firms that use smaller (non-big-five) auditing firms are more likely to. le their grants late. Finally, at the firm level, we estimate that 29.2% of firms manipulated grants to top executives at some point between 1996 and 2005.
引用
收藏
页码:513 / 525
页数:13
相关论文
共 33 条
  • [1] CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures
    Aboody, D
    Kasznik, R
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2000, 29 (01) : 73 - 100
  • [2] ANAND V, 2006, BLOOMBERG NEWS 0526
  • [3] [Anonymous], 2006, WALL STR J
  • [4] The discovery and reporting of internal control deficiencies prior to SOX-mandated audits
    Ashbaugh-Skaife, Hollis
    Collins, Daniel W.
    Kinney, William R., Jr.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS, 2007, 44 (1-2) : 166 - 192
  • [5] The determinants of corporate board size and composition: An empirical analysis
    Boone, Audra L.
    Field, Laura Casares
    Karpoff, Jonathan M.
    Raheja, Charu G.
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2007, 85 (01) : 66 - 101
  • [6] Altering the terms of executive stock options
    Brenner, M
    Sundaram, RK
    Yermack, D
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2000, 57 (01) : 103 - 128
  • [7] Cai J., 2007, Executive Stock Option Exercises
  • [8] The timing of option repricing
    Callaghan, SR
    Saly, RJ
    Subramaniam, C
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCE, 2004, 59 (04) : 1651 - 1676
  • [9] The 'repricing' of executive stock options
    Chance, DM
    Kumar, R
    Todd, RB
    [J]. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2000, 57 (01) : 129 - 154
  • [10] Stock price decreases prior to executive stock option grants
    Chauvin, KW
    Shenoy, C
    [J]. JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 2001, 7 (01) : 53 - 76