The Motivated Processing of Political Arguments

被引:291
作者
Taber, Charles S. [1 ]
Cann, Damon [2 ]
Kucsova, Simona [3 ]
机构
[1] SUNY Stony Brook, Dept Polit Sci, Stony Brook, NY 11794 USA
[2] Utah State Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Logan, UT 84322 USA
[3] Grand Valley State Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Allendale, MI 49401 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Motivated reasoning; Bayes' rule; Political beliefs; Public opinion; Attitude polarization; Political information processing; HOT COGNITION; SKEPTICISM;
D O I
10.1007/s11109-008-9075-8
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
We report the results of an experiment designed to replicate and extend recent findings on motivated political reasoning. In particular, we are interested in disconfirmation biases-the tendency to counter-argue or discount information with which one disagrees-in the processing of political arguments on policy issues. Our experiment examines 8 issues, including some of local relevance and some of national relevance, and manipulates the presentation format of the policy arguments. We find strong support for our basic disconfirmation hypothesis: people seem unable to ignore their prior beliefs when processing arguments or evidence. We also find that this bias is moderated by political sophistication and strength of prior attitude. We do not find, however, that argument type matters, suggesting that motivated biases are quite robust to changes in argument format. Finally, we find strong support for the polarization of attitudes as a consequence of biased processing.
引用
收藏
页码:137 / 155
页数:19
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