Strong managers, weak owners: The political roots of American corporate finance - Roe,MJ

被引：3

作者：

Adler, BE

机构：

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/1073707

中图分类号：

D9 [法律]; DF [法律];

学科分类号：

0301 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：1347 / 1368

页数：22

共 17 条

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