CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

被引:217
作者
Acharya, Viral V. [1 ,2 ]
Richardson, Matthew [1 ]
机构
[1] NYU, Stern Sch Business, New York, NY 10003 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1080/08913810902952903
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Why did the popping of the housing bubble bring the financial systemrather than just the housing sector of the economyto its knees? The answer lies in two methods by which banks had evaded regulatory capital requirements. First, they had temporarily placed assetssuch as securitized mortgagesin off-balance-sheet entities, so that they did not have to hold significant capital buffers against them. Second, the capital regulations also allowed banks to reduce the amount of capital they held against assets that remained on their balance sheetsif those assets took the form of AAA-rated tranches of securitized mortgages. Thus, by repackaging mortgages into mortgage-backed securities, whether held on or off their balance sheets, banks reduced the amount of capital required against their loans, increasing their ability to make loans many-fold. The principal effect of this regulatory arbitrage, however, was to concentrate the risk of mortgage defaults in the banks and render them insolvent when the housing bubble popped.
引用
收藏
页码:195 / 210
页数:16
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