Quality underprovision by a monopolist when quality is not costly

被引：15

作者：

Gabszewicz, JJ

Wauthy, XY ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium

[2] Fac Univ St Louis, CEREC, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2002年 / 77卷 / 01期

关键词：

quality; quantity; vertical differentiation;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00092-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In the Mussa and Rosen model [J Econ Theory 18 (1978) 301] of vertical differentiation, a monopolist may optimally choose to underprovide quality if consumers are allowed to buy several units of the indivisible good, even if quality provision involves no cost of any sort. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：65 / 72

页数：8

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