Sequential bidding in auctions of construction contracts

被引：20

作者：

De Silva, DG ^{[1
]}

Dunne, T ^{[1
]}

Kosmopoulou, G ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Oklahoma, Dept Econ, Norman, OK 73019 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2002年 / 76卷 / 02期

关键词：

asymmetric auctions;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00041-1

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 [经济学];

摘要：

We analyze bidding patterns in morning and afternoon auctions of construction contracts. We find no statistically significant difference in the probability to bid in the afternoon between those who won and those who lost in morning sessions. As a result, the information released in the morning increases the observable asymmetries and affects bidding behavior. Firms that win in the morning bid more aggressively, in the absolute sense, in the afternoon. However, those who lost in morning sessions bid more aggressively, relative to their morning bids, than those who won in the morning. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：239 / 244

页数：6