A Process Model of Complementarity and Substitution of Contractual and Relational Governance in IS Outsourcing

被引:177
作者
Huber, Thomas L. [1 ]
Fischer, Thomas A.
Dibbern, Jens [2 ]
Hirschheim, Rudy [3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Univ Bern, Inst Informat Syst, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland
[2] Univ Bern, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland
[3] Louisiana State Univ, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
[4] Univ Houston, Houston, TX 77004 USA
[5] Templeton Coll Oxford, Oxford, England
[6] London Sch Econ, London, England
基金
瑞士国家科学基金会;
关键词
contract; contractual governance; formal control; informal control; information systems outsourcing; outsourcing; process view; relational governance; trust; ORGANIZATIONAL-CHANGE; SOFTWARE PROJECTS; FORMAL CONTRACTS; TRUST; SYSTEMS; STRATEGIES; PERFORMANCE; PORTFOLIOS; DYNAMICS; FUTURE;
D O I
10.2753/MIS0742-1222300304
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
This paper develops a process model of how and why complementarity and substitution form over time between contractual and relational governance in the context of information systems outsourcing. Our analysis identifies four distinct process patterns that explain this formation as the outcome of interaction processes between key elements of both contractual and relational governance. These patterns unveil the dynamic nature of complementarity and substitution. In particular, we show that the relationship between contractual and relational governance oscillates between complementarity and substitution. Those oscillations are triggered mainly by three types of contextual events (goal fuzziness, goal conflict, and goal misalignment). Surprisingly, substitution of informal control did not occur as an immediate reaction to external events but emerged as a consequence of preceding complementarity. Thus, our study challenges the prevailing view of an either/or dichotomy of complementarity and substitution by showing that they are causally connected over time.
引用
收藏
页码:81 / 114
页数:34
相关论文
共 50 条
[1]   Two types of bureaucracy: Enabling and coercive [J].
Adler, PS ;
Borys, B .
ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 1996, 41 (01) :61-89
[2]   Market, hierarchy, and trust: The knowledge economy and the future of capitalism [J].
Adler, PS .
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, 2001, 12 (02) :215-234
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2004, HDB ORG CHANGE INNOV
[4]  
[Anonymous], 1994, Qualitative data analysis, DOI DOI 10.1080/0140528790010406
[5]  
[Anonymous], 2008, ACAD MANAGE J
[6]  
[Anonymous], 2009, CASE STUDY RES DESIG
[7]   How does it work? The search for explanatory mechanisms [J].
Bunge, M .
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 2004, 34 (02) :182-210
[8]   Balancing and rebalancing in the creation and evolution of organizational control [J].
Cardinal, LB ;
Sitkin, SB ;
Long, CP .
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE, 2004, 15 (04) :411-431
[9]  
Carson SJ, 2006, ACAD MANAGE J, V49, P1058, DOI 10.2307/20159816
[10]   Portfolios of control in outsourced software development projects [J].
Choudhury, V ;
Sabherwal, R .
INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH, 2003, 14 (03) :291-314