On adaptive emergence of trust behavior in the game of stag hunt

被引:33
作者
Fang, C [1 ]
Kimbrough, SO
Valluri, A
Zheng, ZQ
Pace, S
机构
[1] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA
[2] Univ Bocconi, Sch Management, Bocconi, Italy
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
cooperative game; evolutionary game theory; reinforcement learning; simulation spatial game; Stag Hunt game; trust;
D O I
10.1023/A:1020639132471
中图分类号
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
We study the emergence of trust behavior at both the individual and the population levels. At the individual level, in contrast to prior research that views trust as a fixed trait, we model the emergence of trust or cooperation as a result of trial and error learning by a computer algorithm borrowed from the field of artificial intelligence ( Watkins 1989). We show that trust can indeed arise as a result of trial and error learning. Emergence of trust at the population level is modeled by a grid-world consisting of cells of individual agents, a technique known as spatialization in evolutionary game theory. We show that, under a wide range of assumptions, trusting individuals tend to take over the population and trust becomes a systematic property. At both individual and population levels, therefore, we argue that trust behaviors will often emerge as a result of learning.
引用
收藏
页码:449 / 467
页数:19
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