Corporate tax systems and cross country profit shifting

被引:118
作者
Haufler, A
Schjelderup, G
机构
[1] Univ Gottingen, Volkswirtschaftliches Seminar, D-37073 Gottingen, Germany
[2] Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, N-5035 Bergen, Norway
来源
OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES | 2000年 / 52卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.1093/oep/52.2.306
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The paper analyses optimal taxation of corporate profits when governments can choose both the rate and the base of the corporation tax, but are constrained to collect a given amount of corporate tax revenue. In a standard two-period model of investment and international mobility of portfolio capital only, the optimal tax system allows a full deduction for the costs of capital. When foreign direct investment is permitted, however, and firms can shift profits between countries through transfer pricing, it will be optimal for each government to distort investment decisions in order to reduce tax rates and limit the incentive for profit shifting.
引用
收藏
页码:306 / 325
页数:20
相关论文
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