Dual reduction and elementary games

被引:15
作者
Myerson, RB
机构
[1] Ctr. for Math. Studs. in Econ., Northwestern University, Evanston
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1006/game.1997.0573
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Consider the incentive constraints that define the correlated equilibria of a game. The duals of these linear constraints generate Markov chains on the players' strategy sets. The stationary distributions for these Markov chains can be interpreted as the strategies in a reduced game, which is called a dual reduction. Any equilibrium of a dual reduction is an equilibrium of the original game. We say that a game is elementary if all incentive constraints can be satisfied as strict inequalities in a correlated equilibrium. Any game can be reduced to an elementary game by iterative dual reduction. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:183 / 202
页数:20
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