Stable coalition structures with open membership and asymmetric firms

被引:32
作者
Belleflamme, P [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Namur, CITA, B-5000 Namur, Belgium
关键词
coalitions; open membership; oligopoly;
D O I
10.1006/game.1998.0708
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
I study games of coalition formation with open membership where firms form associations in order to decrease their costs before competing on the market. According to previous analysts, only the grand coalition forms at the Nash equilibrium of such games. I show that this result hinges on the assumption of symmetric firms. I therefore introduce asymmetric firms in a game where only two associations can form. I demonstrate that there exists a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium coalition structure in this game, and that when the equilibrium involves two associations, ail the members of an association have a higher taste for this association than all nonmembers do. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, L13. (C) 2000 Academic Press.
引用
收藏
页码:1 / 21
页数:21
相关论文
共 22 条
[1]   EVALUATING TECHNOLOGICAL INFORMATION AND UTILIZING IT - SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE, TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY, AND EXTERNAL LINKAGES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY [J].
ARORA, A ;
GAMBARDELLA, A .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 1994, 24 (01) :91-114
[2]  
Aumann R. J., 1959, Contributions to the Theory of Games IV, P287
[3]   COALITION-FORMATION IN STANDARD-SETTING ALLIANCES [J].
AXELROD, R ;
MITCHELL, W ;
THOMAS, RE ;
BENNETT, DS ;
BRUDERER, E .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 1995, 41 (09) :1493-1508
[4]   Adoption of network technologies in oligopolies [J].
Belleflamme, P .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 1998, 16 (04) :415-444
[5]   COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA .1. CONCEPTS [J].
BERNHEIM, BD ;
PELEG, B ;
WHINSTON, MD .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1987, 42 (01) :1-12
[6]   Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division [J].
Bloch, F .
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 1996, 14 (01) :90-123
[7]   ENDOGENOUS STRUCTURES OF ASSOCIATION IN OLIGOPOLIES [J].
BLOCH, F .
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1995, 26 (03) :537-556
[8]  
BLOCK F, 1997, NONCOOPERATIVE MODEL
[9]  
Fudenberg D., 1991, GAME THEORY
[10]   Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry [J].
Konishi, H ;
LeBreton, M ;
Weber, S .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 1997, 72 (01) :225-237