The repeated lake game

被引：10

作者：

Brock, WA

de Zeeuw, A

机构：

[1] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econ, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

[2] Tilburg Univ, CentER, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands

[3] Univ Wisconsin, Social Syst Res Inst, Madison, WI USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2002年 / 76卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

ecological systems; shallow lakes; repeated games; trigger strategies;

D O I：

10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00030-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In common property ecological systems such as shallow lakes, an increasing number of users leads to additional Nash equilibria with considerably lower welfare. When the game is repeated, these bad outcomes can be turned into an advantage. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：109 / 114

页数：6