Ex-ante efficiency of bankruptcy procedures

被引：34

作者：

Cornelli, F

Felli, L

机构：

[1] UNIV LONDON LONDON SCH ECON & POLIT SCI,DEPT ECON,LONDON WC2A 2AE,ENGLAND

[2] LONDON BUSINESS SCH,LONDON NW1 4SA,ENGLAND

来源：

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1997年 / 41卷 / 3-5期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00009-3

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper suggests a framework to analyze the efficiency properties of bankruptcy procedures, distinguishing between ex-ante and ex-post efficiency. Ex-post efficiency consists in maximizing the ex-post value of the insolvent firm, whereas ex-ante efficiency consists in maximizing the proceeds to creditors from the reorganization of the firm and providing incentives for the creditors to monitor the firm, We show that the definition of creditors' ownership rights over the company and the protection of the creditors' seniority, are crucial to asses the ex-ante efficiency of a bankruptcy procedure. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science B.V.

引用

页码：475 / 485

页数：11

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