The effects of corporate governance on firms' credit ratings

被引：653

作者：

Ashbaugh-Skaife, Hollis

Collins, Daniel W. ^{[1
]}

LaFond, Ryan

机构：

[1] Univ Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA

[2] Univ Wisconsin, Madison, WI USA

[3] MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 42卷 / 1-2期

关键词：

corporate governance; credit rating; executive compensation;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.02.003

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

We investigate whether firms with strong corporate governance benefit from higher credit ratings relative to firms with weaker governance. We document, after controlling for firm-specific risk characteristics, that credit ratings are negatively associated with the number of blockholders and CEO power, and positively related to takeover defenses, accrual quality, earnings timeliness, board independence, board stock ownership, and board expertise. We also provide evidence that CEOs of firms with speculative-grade credit ratings are overcompensated to a greater degree than their counterparts at firms with investment-grade ratings, thus providing one explanation for why some firms operate with weak governance. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：203 / 243

页数：41

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