The adverse consequences of the politics of agency design for presidential management in the United States: The relative durability of insulated agencies

被引:52
作者
Lewis, DE [1 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Woodrow Wilson Sch, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1017/s0007123404000109
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The US Congress has often sought to limit presidential influence over certain public policies by designing agencies that are insulated from presidential control. Whether or not insulated agencies persist over time has important consequences for presidential management. If those agencies that persist over time are also those that are the most immune from presidential direction, this has potentially fatal consequences for the president's ability to manage the executive branch. Modem presidents will preside over a less and less manageable bureaucracy over time. This article explains why agencies insulated from presidential control are more durable than other agencies and shows that they have a significantly higher expected duration than other agencies. The conclusion is that modem American presidents preside over a bureaucracy that is increasingly insulated from their control.
引用
收藏
页码:377 / 404
页数:28
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