Conditions for Intuitive Expertise A Failure to Disagree

被引:1213
作者
Kahneman, Daniel [1 ]
Klein, Gary [2 ]
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Woodrow Wilson Sch Publ & Int Affairs, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[2] Appl Res Associates, Fairborn, OH USA
关键词
intuition; expertise; overconfidence; heuristics; judgment; OPTION-GENERATION; JUDGMENT; DETERMINANTS; TASK;
D O I
10.1037/a0016755
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
This article reports on an effort to explore the differences between two approaches to intuition and expertise that are often viewed as conflicting: heuristics and biases (HB) and naturalistic decision making (NDM). Starting from the obvious fact that professional intuition is sometimes marvelous and sometimes flawed, the authors attempt to map the boundary conditions that separate trite intuitive skill from overconfident and biased impressions. They conclude that evaluating the likely quality of art intuitive judgment requires an assessment of the predictability of the environment in which the judgment is made and of the individual's opportunity to learn the regularities of that environment. Subjective experience is not a reliable indicator of judgment accuracy.
引用
收藏
页码:515 / 526
页数:12
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